

National Security Council Files

Was - November 11, 1943 thru December 31, 1943
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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
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SECRET/EXDIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center

MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE
Situation Report # 120

Situation Report in the Middle East as of 0600 EST, 11/17/73

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1. Israeli-Egyptian Agreement: Al-Ahram's November 17 issue said Egypt has decided to postpone a scheduled November 18 meeting with the Israelis at Kilometer 101. According to wire service reports, the Al-Ahram story said Egypt is postponing the meeting pending the outcome of "important international contacts" which have been taking place in the past twenty-four hours with a view to restoring the ceasefire lines as they existed on October 22. This Al-Ahram story did not specify with whom the contacts are taking place but another story noted "lengthy" meetings between Foreign Minister Fahmi and Ambassador Eilts.

The POW exchange is expected to continue November 17 and the wire services report that a number similar to that exchanged November 16 will be returned. The Reuter's tally of prisoners exchanged thus far is 54 Israelis and 1,368 Egyptians. The evacuation of sick and wounded from Suez city reportedly is continuing and some 400 are expected to be moved November 17. Reuter reports that the search of the Suez battlefields for the dead will begin Sunday.

Prime Minister Meir told her television audience Friday evening that Egyptian and Israeli forces should return to the October 5 lines plus a small additional distance from the Canal's banks in order to make room for UN forces between the opposing forces. Mrs. Meir also repeated her view that a peace conference should not begin until after Israel's December 31 elections. She told her audience that various contacts with Syria concerning the POW problem had taken place and that further efforts were being made. Mrs. Meir, responding to a question, said she agreed with President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger that the prospects for peace are better than they have been: "There is more room for hope now."

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GDS - DECLASS Dec. 31, 1981

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2. Israel-Syria-UN: Secretary General Waldheim told Ambassador Scali that President Asad--whom Guyer found to be less rigid than Syrian diplomats--proposed that both sides return to the October 6 lines, an arrangement which would leave Israel with its one pre-war post on Mt. Hermon which Syria claims the IDF lost and then retook after October 22. Syria will hand the "other two Mt. Hermon" posts to UN forces. Asad reportedly told Guyer that Syria would go ahead with a POW exchange if there were a "declaration of intent" to return to the October 6 line. Urquhart told us Mrs. Meir rejected Asad's proposal. Mrs. Meir contends that the POW and territorial issues should not be linked. Urquhart reported that Mrs. Meir did not accept Guyer's idea of an intermediate ceasefire line; a Jerusalem UN source told us that she did not specifically reject Guyer's idea. President Asad is said to feel that Israel is "not serious" in its offer of a POW exchange tied to the return of Syrian villagers to their homes in the Saasa salient.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OPERATIONS CENTER
APPROVED BY: <i>K. Fung</i>
DATE: 10/10/73

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RES-54



RESEARCH STUDY

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

November 16, 1973

THE OCTOBER WAR AND THE SOVIET POSITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

This report analyzes the Soviet position in the Middle East and suggests some of the problems and opportunities which the October Arab-Israeli war has created for Moscow.

ABSTRACT

The Middle East crisis has provided a testing ground for the Soviet Union's detente policies and its new improved relationship with the United States. In contrast to 1967, Moscow's behavior during the crisis was characterized both by a determination to play to the hilt a superpower role in Middle Eastern affairs and by a serious effort to contain elements of confrontation with the US. The Soviets weighed their interests and concluded that the imperatives of their position in the Middle East required them to risk damaging detente, but to minimize this risk Moscow took deliberate steps to put the best possible face on its moves.

The crisis began with Moscow's position in the Arab world uncertain. For various reasons Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, the major targets of Soviet efforts in the Middle East, had a relationship with Moscow which had come under significant strains in the months preceding the war.

This report was produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research Aside from normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, it has not been coordinated elsewhere.

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SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
DECLASSIFIED ON DECEMBER 31, 1979

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Uncertainties remain, but the Soviets may achieve important gains--if only, in many cases, because the war has drawn a number of Arab states deeper into the Arab-Israeli conflict and damaged American interests there. How successful the Soviets prove to be in exploiting these opportunities will depend both on shifting Arab perceptions of the degree of the USSR's support for the Arab states and on the course of efforts to achieve a settlement. If Moscow makes gains in the Arab world in the wake of the war, most likely they will flow from Arab reaction to the US commitment to Israel, rather than from any Arab sense of commitment to friendship with the USSR. Soviet participation in any settlement negotiations will, in any case, undoubtedly be aimed at carving out a substantial area of Soviet influence in the Middle East, even if peace is achieved, as well as in legitimizing its superpower role there.

INR/USSR and Europe
Director: KAKerst (Acting) *KAK*
Analyst : Johnson
Ext. : 23367
Released by: DEMark *DEM*

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Prelude to War: An Increasingly Uncertain Soviet Position

On the eve of the recent Arab-Israeli war, the Soviet position in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq--based largely on arms deliveries--rested upon unsteady foundations. For various reasons each of these states, the major targets of Soviet efforts in the Middle East, had a relationship with Moscow which had come under significant strains in the months preceding the war.

The "Confrontation States." For the "confrontation states," Egypt and Syria, these difficulties can be traced to Soviet policy vis-a-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict. Moscow was willing to back Arab diplomatic initiatives with public approval and propaganda support, but also seemed willing, at least in Arab eyes, to relegate the Arab-Israeli impasse to the back burner in Soviet priorities. Brezhnev's summit performance in the US increased suspicions that Moscow was willing to make superpower deals at the expense of its Arab friends. Perennial Arab dissatisfaction with the quality and types of weapons which the Soviets provided was also a persistent irritant. The USSR was in part serving as the target for Arab feelings of impotence and frustration, alleged Soviet inaction or non-provision of offensive weapons being convenient rationales in the apportionment of blame for a lack of movement toward regaining the occupied territories.

Following the Washington summit, the Soviets attempted to mend fences. In July, Sadat's adviser, Hafez Isma'il, was received by Brezhnev in Moscow, and Kirilenko went to Syria, ostensibly for the ceremonies marking the opening of the Euphrates Dam. During the immediate post-summit weeks, Soviet-Egyptian polemics flared, and there was speculation that Sadat might denounce the Soviet-Egyptian Friendship Treaty. In September, Syrian expulsion of some Soviet advisers and restriction of the movements of the rest pointed to an increased strain in relations with the Soviets.

Iraq. In Iraq, the churnings of internal politics, Baghdad's desire to emerge from its area isolation, and the Ba'th regime's moves toward closer economic ties with the West subjected Soviet-Iraqi relations to frustrations and strains. The Soviet position in Iraq, developed principally as Iraq's chief arms supplier, has been hostage to an unstable internal situation. The Soviets have long been urging Baghdad to form a Ba'th-Communist-Kurdish front, and a CPSU delegation, led by Politburo candidate member Rashidov, which was in Iraq at the time the Ba'th announced a cooperation agreement with the Communists (July 10), may have taken an active role in bringing it about--a possibility hinted at in the Soviet press. However, Soviet attempts to bring the Kurds into a "united national front" foundered. Meanwhile, purges following the June 30 coup

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attempt seem to have eliminated many of Moscow's friends from the Iraqi regime, while cementing the position of those who, particularly since the Iraq Petroleum Company settlement in March, favored closer ties with the West, especially in economic matters. One measure of the difficulties posed for the Soviets by these developments, which Moscow probably saw in the making some time before they came to fruition, and of Moscow's desire to protect its investment in Iraq, was the delivery to Iraq, in September, of TU-22 bombers--supersonic aircraft heretofore not deployed outside the Soviet Union. Indeed, in Egypt and Syria, as well as in Iraq, the Soviets seemed to be attempting to shore up their increasingly uncertain position with the delivery of more sophisticated arms. ✓

Soviet Contingency Planning. Perhaps Moscow was considering another strategy as well--the possible reestablishment of relations with Israel. The abortive Soviet-Israeli cement deal in August foundered on Israeli publicity which focused Arab attention on the anomaly of Soviet Jewish emigration to Israel, but the episode did raise the recognition issue implicitly. The Soviets may well have been willing to make further gestures toward a closer relationship with Israel in the months to come, to put the Arabs on notice that Soviet tolerance had its limits.]

One concomitant of such a move, and of increasing strains in Soviet relations with the Arab regimes, would be regularization of Soviet relations with the fedayeen. In fact, during the spring there were reports that the Soviet Union was probing methods of dealing with the Palestinians as a national liberation movement--including hints that Moscow would recognize a Palestinian government-in-exile. This complicated Soviet relations with Syria, which would prefer not to see the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) play the role which Moscow seems to have envisaged. The August 3 announcement by the GDR that the PLO would be able to open an office in East Berlin, bringing the Palestinians into a semi-official relationship with one member of the Warsaw Pact, argues that the USSR was testing a new approach to the Palestinian issue. ✓

A Balance Sheet for the October War: Soviet Prospects in the Middle East

If the Soviets were considering such an option vis-a-vis Israel, the outbreak of a new Arab-Israeli war entirely changed the framework for such a move, as for many other possible options. The evidence suggests that Moscow had at least some advance notice of the Arab attack on Israel, and probably counseled Sadat against it, largely because of Moscow's dim view of Arab military capabilities. Initially, the Soviets, expecting a rapid Arab debacle, stood aside from the growing crisis, withdrawing many of their dependents from the "confrontation states," while privately and publicly urging Arab solidarity.]

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The October 7 Soviet Government Statement stopped short of directly blaming Israel for initiating hostilities, made no explicit charge of US complicity, and contained no intimation of Soviet action in the crisis, while proclaiming the USSR's "resolute support for the legal demands of the Arab states for the liberation of all Arab territories occupied by Israel." This relatively weak stance probably was, in Arab eyes, proof of some of their doubts about Soviet support, a reaction which may return to haunt Moscow in these countries, particularly Egypt, despite the massive airlift and sealift of arms which the Soviet Union mounted when it became apparent that the war would be somewhat prolonged.

Thus, if Moscow makes gains in the Arab world in the wake of the war, most likely they will flow from Arab reaction to the US commitment to Israel, rather than from any Arab sense of commitment to friendship with the USSR. Increasing pressure upon US interests and decline of US influence in the Arab area would be a Soviet gain, in the negative sense.

But the war and its aftermath, by damaging US interests in the Middle East, would offer the Soviets new opportunities as well. The war in the Middle East has drawn deeper into the Arab-Israeli conflict many states heretofore somewhat removed from it--the countries of North Africa and the conservative states of the Persian Gulf--speeding a trend toward increased involvement which was slowly developing even before the fighting erupted. Increased activity in Soviet-Moroccan relations during the spring, capped by Soviet transport of a Moroccan contingent to the front in Syria, was one sign of this development, as was the closer Saudi-Egyptian relationship. In the coming months the conservative Gulf states, in particular, may be targets of opportunity. Since the energy crisis was given wide public attention early this year, Soviet propaganda has urged the people of the Gulf to move against Western oil interests, against the traditional regimes which cooperate with them, and against the American and British presence which allegedly supports them--a presence construed by the Soviet propaganda as a form of cooperation with Israel. This line has meshed well with recent events, and the future may see some form of Soviet diplomatic entree to Saudi Arabia and the smaller conservative Gulf states, which Saudi policy and influence have until now blocked.

However, new openings for the Soviets in the Middle East depend upon the outcome of US approaches to the Arabs in the process of attempting to reach a settlement. If successful, such approaches would reduce the potential for Soviet gains, though it is hard to imagine how the Soviets could emerge as net losers. It is true that Moscow's Arab clients have not been particularly comfortable with their relationship with the Soviet Union, for all sorts of historical, cultural, religious, and geopolitical reasons, but they have lacked other options. While the possibility of a US option is a card which the Arabs would certainly not be reluctant to

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play in future dealings with the Soviets, it is highly probable that the Arabs will want to hedge their bets among the major powers, and this alone will provide a reliable opening for the USSR.

Considerations of Detente

It appears that Moscow considers that its stake in the Middle East as a test of its role as a global superpower is sufficiently high to risk--though not abandon--detente, and indeed, during the recent war Moscow may well have been acting under the perception that it can safely maneuver here without irreparably jeopardizing basic United States interest in detente. It remains to be seen whether the Soviets can parley this risktaking into an increased credibility vis-a-vis the Arabs. At the same time, the Soviet Union has an interest in preserving Israel as a viable counterweight to the Arab states, for without this, much of the rationale for Soviet presence in the Arab world vanishes. The factors of detente, Soviet willingness to support the Arab cause, and Soviet interest in preserving Israel as a "problem" will probably set the main limits for Soviet policy in the Middle East as the results of the most recent Arab-Israeli war are digested.

Soviet behavior during the achievement of a cease-fire demonstrated Moscow's determination to play an important role as key arbiter of Middle Eastern affairs. The Soviets threatened possible unilateral action to enforce a Middle East cease-fire--a threat prompted by the desire to forestall further Israeli gains and an Egyptian military debacle--and Moscow did unilaterally dispatch observers to follow implementation of the October 24 cease-fire. Despite the high risks which such moves posed for detente, Soviet cooperation with the US in effecting a cessation of the hostilities seemed on balance a positive contribution. Soviet participation in the ensuing negotiating process will, in part through promoting Arab interests, undoubtedly be aimed at carving out a substantial area of influence in the Middle East, even if peace is achieved, as well as in legitimizing its superpower role there.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center

MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE
Situation Report #119

Situation Report in the Middle East as of 1500 EST, 11/16/7

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1. Ceasefire: There were no ceasefire violations reported on either the Egyptian or Syrian fronts. However, on the Lebanon-Israel border there are reports that on November 16 mortar shells and bazooka rockets were fired from Lebanese territory at an Israeli Army patrol and a communal settlement. These weapons were believed to have been fired by Palestinian guerrillas operating from Lebanon. According to USDAO/Tel Aviv, the IDF crossed the Lebanon-Israel border on November 16 and entered the area of Aalma as-Sha'b in search of a number of rocket launchers. During the search the IDF received some mortar fire from the Lebanese Army. The fire was returned and the IDF withdrew. No launchers were found and no casualties were reported.

2. Israeli-Egyptian Agreement: There are unconfirmed reports that Israeli troops on November 15 transferred control of the checkpoints at kilometers 101 and 119 at the entrance of the City of Suez on the Cairo-Suez road to the UN. According to the press, Egypt freed another 28 Israeli POWs on November 16 and Israel released 294 Egyptian POWs on the second day of the POW exchange. According to a Red Cross official in Cairo, 54 Israeli POWs have been exchanged for nearly 750 Egyptian POWs as of midday November 16 and a total of about 1,000 Egyptian POWs will be repatriated to Egypt today and 400 civilians will be evacuated from Suez City to Cairo.

Israeli Government sources told UPI correspondent Joseph Grigg that a new Israeli offer is expected to be discussed next week by Israeli Maj. Gen. Aharon Yariv and Egyptian Maj. Gen. Mohammed Gemassy at kilometer 101 on the Cairo-Suez road. This offer is reported to have three major parts:

-- Both sides would withdraw to their positions as of October 5, the day before the war broke out. Accordingly, the Egyptian 2nd and 3rd Corp Areas would pull back to the

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western bank of the Canal and the Israelis would give up their 625 square mile salient on the West Bank of the Canal.

-- A 10 kilometer (six mile) strip would be set up on each side of the Canal to be administered by UN peace-keeping troops.

-- The Egyptian 3rd Corps Army would be permitted to cross back into Egypt unmolested, but would not be allowed to take along its heavy armaments.

The Israeli proposals are reportedly maximum demands which would be negotiated.

3. UNEF: A new phase of the UNEF build-up began today with the lift, by the USAF, of a 50-man advance party of Peru's 500-man contribution to the UNEF to Israel. The flight marks the first UNEF soldiers flown directly into Israel and the first insertion of line troops from a new national contributor in several weeks. The force now numbers 2,061. Within a week, it may rise to as many as 2,900, and by early December, with the insertion of Peruvian, Panamanian, and Indonesian battalions, the force could swell to about 4000. Composition of the force on November 16 was as follows:

Austrians	362
Canadians	253
Finns	573
Irish	260
Peruvians	52
Poles	18
Swedes	543
TOTAL	2,061

The USAF is also lifting communications equipment, mosquito netting, and map sets from the United States to Egypt, at the UN's request, today and tomorrow.

4. Syrian Attitude: According to a senior UN source (protect) in Jerusalem, UN Under Secretary General Guyer in his conversations with Syrian President Asad and other Syrian officials in Damascus found them reasonably satisfied with the current situation, or at least prepared to live with it for some period of time. The Syrians indicated some interest in trading Israeli POWs for territory, but apparently had no specific proposal under consideration.

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The source pointed out that the Syrian and Egyptian situations are quite different. The Egyptian 3rd Corps and Suez City encirclement provide the basis for a quid pro quo arrangement with the Israelis on POWs. The Syrians have no comparable problem and thus feel under no similar pressure to move toward agreement. (Note: Sitrep 118 reports UNSYG Waldheim's discussion with Ambassador Scali on the tough line adopted by the Syrians in their talks with Under Secretary Guyer in Damascus and that the Syrians are not interested in "partial arrangements" such as the Israeli-Egyptian agreement.)

The chief of Israeli Air Force intelligence informed our Air Attache in Tel Aviv on November 15 that he was pessimistic about the fate of Israeli POWs in Syria and added that the few captured Israelis that made it to Syrian prisons may have a chance for survival. However, there are growing reports that many IDF personnel captured near the front lines were killed by forward Syrian troops before their transfer to prison could be accomplished.

Syrian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Abd al-Halim Khaddam arrived in Cairo on November 16 for talks with Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmi. In his arrival statement in Cairo, Khaddam said he was carrying a message from Syrian President Asad to President Sadat. Khaddam supported the convening of an Arab summit meeting. Concerning the POW question, Khaddam stated that Israel has violated and contravened international agreements; that it has used Syrian POWs during the war to detonate land mines in front of IDF units; that Israel has refused to hand over bodies of Syrian dead and has expelled Syrian citizens from their villages. Therefore, Khaddam said, Israel must respect and implement international agreements before Syria will consider doing the same.


5. Meeting of OECD Oil Community in Paris: According to the OECD oil committee, information assembled by the OECD from the oil companies indicates that European oil supplies up to November 15 are running at a 15-20% reduction, and that after November 15 it is estimated that there will be a 25% reduction in oil supplies in Europe. It is estimated that there is a 75-day supply of oil stocks in Europe. As for the U.S., its imports are estimated to be down by 3 million bpd which is equivalent to 17% of U.S. consumption.

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6. Saudi Arabian Pressures on Japan: Prime Minister Tanaka told Ambassador Ingersoll that he wished the U.S. to understand the oil pressures being brought to bear against Japan and that the Japanese Ambassador to Washington hopes to be able to keep in close touch with Secretary Kissinger on this matter. According to the Prime Minister, the Saudis are insisting that Japan make a public announcement in support of Arab objectives in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Saudis demanded that the Japanese publicly call for immediate and total withdrawal of Israel from all occupied territories and restoration of the just rights of the Palestinian people. Also, the Saudis demanded that Japan make it clear that if Israel did not do so, Japan would reconsider its policy towards Israel and would break diplomatic relations. The Saudis threaten that if such a statement is not made, Arab oil to Japan would be further reduced from the present 20% level to 40% in January. According to the Japanese press, the Japanese Government might send a special envoy to the Arab countries in an effort to resolve the current oil crisis. This possibility is generally regarded by press sources as a reflection of the GOJ's determination to embark on an independent pro-Arab diplomatic move because Japan reportedly failed to find a way out of the oil crisis during Prime Minister Tanaka's talks with Secretary Kissinger.

APPROVED BY: 

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS

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Operations Center

MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE
Situation Report #117

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Situation Report in the Middle East as of 1800 EST, 11/15/73

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Attached is Middle East Situation Report 117 which was
cabled to the Secretary's party and to Assistant Secre-
tary Sisco.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OPERATIONS CENTER

APPROVED BY:

Roderick M. Wright

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS

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GDS - DECLASS Dec. 31, 1981

FORM DS 322(OCR)

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NEA TASK FORCE:EWALKER:BDF
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1. CEASEFIRE: OTHER THAN MINOR VIOLATIONS REPORTED BY IDF, ALL WAS QUIET NOV. 15 BOTH ON CANAL AND IN GOLAN. IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLES C THROUGH F OF CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT PROGRESSED SMOOTHLY. TWENTY-SIX WOUNDED ISRAELIS AND 375 EGYPTIAN SOLDIERS EXCHANGED BY AIRLIFT NOV. 15. GENERALS YARIV AND GAMASSY MET AT KILOMETER 101 TO WORK OUT ARRANGEMENTS FOR EVACUATION OF FROM 1200-1500 SICK AND WOUNDED FROM SUEZ CITY. EVACUATION WILL BE CARRIED OUT BY ICRC NOV. 16. NEXT ISRAELI/EGYPTIAN MEETING, ACCORDING TO PRESS, NOW SCHEDULED FOR NEXT WEEK. DISQUIETING NOTE REPORTED BY AFP WHICH CLAIMED PDRY FONMIN SAID NOV. 15 THAT BLOCKADE OF BAB AL-MANDEB WAS BEING CARRIED OUT BY EGYPTIAN NAVY AND S. YEMENI GROUND FORCES ON PERIM ISLAND.

2. ISRAELI REACTION: REACTION IN TEL AVIV TO RETURN OF FIRST ISRAELI POWS WAS EBULLIENT. RIGHT WINGERS EVEN CALLED OFF DEMONSTRATIONS OPPOSING GOI "SURRENDER TO FOREIGN

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PRESSURES" SO AS NOT TO INTERFERE WITH GENERAL REJOICING. DEFMIN DAYAN WELCOMED RETURNING POWS AND ACCORDING TO REUTER SAID, "FINALLY, FINALLY WE ARE GETTING SOMEWHERE, NOW THAT WE ARE BEGINNING TO BEHAVE LIKE HUMAN BEINGS-- NEGOTIATING INSTEAD OF FIGHTING." DAYAN SAID THAT NEXT ORDER OF BUSINESS WAS POWS HELD BY SYRIA AND ADDED THAT ISRAEL HAD ALREADY AGREED TO REPATRIATION OF 15,000 SYRIAN VILLAGERS DISPLACED IN RECENT FIGHTING AS PART OF POW EXCHANGE. FONMIN EBAN, MEANWHILE, DISCUSSED SYRIAN QUESTION WITH SYG WALDHEIM.

3. EC NINE CONTINUED TO FACE IMPASSE ON JOINT ENERGY DEMARCHE TO ARABS AFTER FRENCH REJECTED TEXT DEVELOPED IN NOV. 12-13 MEETINGS. MATTER MAY BE RAISED AGAIN AT NOV. 20 MEETING OF FONMINS. 44

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center

MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE
Situation Report # 108

Situation Report in the Middle East as of 1230 EST, 11/11/73

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Attached is Middle East Task Force Situation Report
number 108, which was cabled to the Secretary's party.

APPROVED BY:

K. J. King
Deputy Director
for Operations

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GDS - DECLASS Dec. 31, 1981

FORM DS 322(OCR)

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NEA/TF:SWARD:CF
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NEA/TF:NANDERSON

S/S-O - KA.KURZE

IMMEDIATE ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS, NOUAKCHOTT
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TAGS: PFOR, XF
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PEKING FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY
ROME FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO
INFORM CONSULS
VIENNA PASS USDEL MBFR
KUWAIT POUCH MUSCAT AND DOHA
BEIRUT PASS BAGHDAD
COAST GUARD FOR POLAD

1. EGYPTIAN/ISRAELI AGREEMENT. THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI SIX POINT AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED AS SCHEDULED AT 1500 LOCAL NOVEMBER 11. MAJOR GENERAL YARIV SIGNED FOR ISRAEL AND MAJOR GENERAL JAMHASI FOR EGYPT. DUE TO COMMUNICATIONS DIFFICULTIES NEWS OF THE SIGNING WAS LATE IN REACHING ISRAELI AUTHORITIES.

2. 'ARAFAT TO MOSCOW. ARAB MEDIA REPORT PLO CHAIRMAN YASIR 'ARAFAT HAS TRAVELLED TO MOSCOW TO HOLD TALKS WITH SOVIET OFFICIALS ON THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION. THERE IS NO CONFIRMATION OF THESE REPORTS FROM MOSCOW. LEBANESE PAPER AL ANWAR SAYS THAT PFLP LEADER GEORGE HABASH AND MAYIF HAWATMEN (HEAD OF DPFLP) WILL JOIN 'ARAFAT IN MOSCOW. ACCORDING TO AN AFP REPORT FROM BEIRUT, AL FATAH HAS ISSUED A COMMUNIQUE CATEGORICALLY DENYING THAT THE ORGANIZATION

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HAD CONSENTED TO ATTEND A MIDDLE EAST PEACE CONFERENCE.

3. AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE EILTS IN CAIRO. CAIRO MENA REPORTED AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE EILTS' ARRIVAL IN CAIRO NOVEMBER 11. MENA NOTED EILTS' ARRIVAL COINCIDES WITH THE SIGNING OF THE SIX POINT AGREEMENT AND CARRIED EXCERPTS FROM HIS ARRIVAL STATEMENT.

4. SOVIET MISSILES IN EGYPT. USINT CAIRO WAS TOLD BY A SOVIET TASS CORRESPONDENT THAT THE USSR HAD AGREED TO AN EGYPTIAN REQUEST TO SEND SSMS AND SOVIET CREWS TO EGYPT. THE MISSILES ARRIVED ABOUT OCTOBER 16. THE SOURCE ADDED IMMEDIATELY BEFORE CEASE-FIRE SEVERAL MISSILES HAD BEEN LAUNCHED AGAINST ISRAELI POSITIONS IN GAZA AREA. SOURCE SAID MISSILES MANNED ONLY BY SOVIET CREWS AND UNDER THE EXCLUSIVE OF SOVIET CONTROL; HE ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT A NUMBER OF MIG-23S HAD BEEN DELIVERED TO EGYPT AND WERE BEING FLOWN BY EGYPTIAN PILOTS.

5. UNEF/UNTSO. A CANADIAN UN ALCE CONTINGENT OF ELEVEN OFFICERS AND THIRTY-TWO ENLISTED PERSONNEL HAS ARRIVED IN CAIRO. THE CANADIAN FORCE HAS OPERATIONS AND TRAFFIC TEAMS AND WILL PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR ALL UN AIRLIFTS. WITH CANADIAN ALCE TEAM ON BOARD, US PERSONNEL (435TH ALCE) BEING RETURNED TO FRG.

6. HAYKAL EDITORIAL. AL AHRAH EDITOR HAYKAL HAS RENEWED HIS CALL FOR AN ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE TO DRAW UP A COMPREHENSIVE ARAB STRATEGY PRIOR TO THE CONVOCATION OF A PEACE CONFERENCE. HAYKAL SAID HE IS STILL CONVINCED PEACE IS "FAR, FAR AWAY" AND CITED SECRETARY'S BELIEF THAT SIX MONTHS TO YEAR NEEDED TO REACH REASONABLE BEGINNING IN SUPPORT OF THIS THESIS. HAYKAL ALSO EXPRESSED ~~FWW~~ RESERVATIONS ABOUT U.S. STAND TOWARD CRISIS, QUESTIONING PRESIDENT NIXON'S ABILITY TO CONFRONT JEWISH AND ISRAELI PRESSURE GROUPS.

7. ASST SEC SISCO IN BEIRUT. MR. SISCO LEFT BEIRUT FOR ROME AT 1213Z NOV 11. LEBANESE FM NAFTA TOLD REPORTERS THAT ATMOSPHERE WHICH PREVAILED IN HIS TALKS WITH SISCO "GIVES RISE TO OPTIMISM THAT PEACE IN THIS REGION IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE AND NOT VERY REMOTE." 44

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ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-05 11-00 12-10 10-14 ACDA-19 PM-07 NSC-10

SPC-03 SS-04 SEC-01 11-00 12-10 NSAE-00 DODE-00

INRE-00 SSD-04 11-00 12-10 UNCLAS 1136 W
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O R 111140Z NOV 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0001
INTO RUEKSG/AMEMBASSY AMEMB-2268
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USUN NEW YORK 2268

S E C R E T CAIRO 3475

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MARR EG UR
SUBJECT: REPORT OF SOVIET EQUIPMENT IN EGYPT; SOVIET VIEW
OF MILITARY SITUATION X

1. SUMMARY: TASS OFFICER STATES THAT USSR HAS
DELIVERED SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES AND FLOGGERS TO
EGYPT. END SUMMARY.

2. DURING COURSE OF CONVERSATION NOVEMBER 10, USINTOFF
ASKED DEPUTY TASS DIRECTOR YEDRASHNIKOV, IDENTIFIED AS
A PROBABLE RIS OFFICER, ABOUT REPORTS OF SOVIET-MANNED
SSMIS IN EGYPT. YEDRASHNIKOV EXPLAINED THAT AFTER
CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE BY EGYPTIANS, SOVIETS HAD FINALLY
AGREED TO SEND LIMITED NUMBER OF SSM'S (HE DID NOT
GIVE PRECISE FIGURE BUT SAID THAT USINTOFF'S UNDER-
STANDING OF APPROXIMATELY 40 WAS "ABOUT RIGHT") ALONG
WITH SOVIET CREWS TO EGYPT. THEY HAD ARRIVED AT CAIRO
WEST SHORTLY BEFORE OCTOBER 10, WHEN SADAT HAD SPOKEN
OF PRESENCE OF ZAPIR MISSILES CAPABLE OF STRIKING ISRAEL
IN DEPTH. YEDRASHNIKOV CONTINUED THAT IMMEDIATELY

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PRECEDING OCTOBER 22 CEASEFIRE, SEVERAL OF THESE MISSILES HAD BEEN LAUNCHED AGAINST ISRAELI POSITIONS. HE SAID HE BELIEVED THAT THESE ISRAELI TARGETS WERE IN GAZA AREA.

3. YEDRASHNIKOV CONTINUED THAT PURPOSE OF SSM'S WAS TO POSE THREAT OF REVENGE AGAINST ISRAELI CIVILIAN TARGETS SHOULD ISRAEL STRIKE CAIRO OR OTHER POPULATED CENTERS IN EGYPT. THEY WERE MANNED ONLY BY SOVIET CREWS AND WERE UNDER EXCLUSIVE SOVIET CONTROL. YEDRASHNIKOV ADDED THAT IN VIEW OF SMALL SIZE OF WARHEAD, IMPACT OF SSM'S WAS PRIMARILY POLITICAL. HE NOTED PROBABILITY THAT THEY WOULD BE USED SHOULD ISRAELIS THREATEN CAIRO.

4. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION, YEDRASHNIKOV ACKNOWLEDGED THAT A NUMBER (UNSTATED) OF MIG-23'S HAD ALSO BEEN DELIVERED TO EGYPT. HE SAID THEY WERE MANNED BY EGYPTIAN PILOTS, AND NOT BY SOVIETS.

5. REGARDING OTHER EQUIPMENT, YEDRASHNIKOV CLAIMED NO KNOWLEDGE OF LARGE NUMBERS OF ARMORED VEHICLES WITH SOVIET CREWS IN EGYPT. CONCERNING PERSONNEL, HE SAID THAT SOVIET ELEMENT SENT TO EGYPT TO OBSERVE THE CEASEFIRE WAS STILL BARRACKED ON OUTSKIRTS OF CAIRO AND HAD NOT BEEN DEPLOYED INTO FIELD.

6. USINTOFF ASKED YEDRASHNIKOV FOR AN ESTIMATE OF PRESENT EGYPTIAN MILITARY SITUATION. HE REPLIED THAT EGYPTIANS WERE IN HIGHLY DANGEROUS POSITION AT TIME OF OCTOBER 22 CEASE-FIRE, BUT HAD SUBSEQUENTLY CONSIDERABLY STRENGTHENED THEIR POSITION OPPOSITE ISRAELI "POCKET" ON WEST BANK. HE THOUGHT THAT IT WAS NOW "TECHNICALLY POSSIBLE" FOR EGYPTIAN ARMY TO DESTROY ISRAELI FORCE ON WEST BANK SHOULD IT DECIDE TO DO SO. YEDRASHNIKOV REPEATED THAT THIS WAS A POSSIBILITY AND NOT A CERTAINTY; AND HE THOUGHT THAT SADAT HAD HELD BACK FROM RESUMING HOSTILITIES OUT OF CAUTION AND OUT OF DESIRE TO SEE IF DIPLOMACY WOULD ACHIEVE HIS ENDS WITHOUT FURTHER FIGHTING. YEDRASHNIKOV NOTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE FOR RESUMPTION

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OF FIGHTING BEFORE ARRIVAL OF SECRETARY, BUT THIS HAD ABATED WITHIN PAST SEVERAL DAYS.

7. DURING THE CONVERSATION, YEDRASHNIKOV SAID THAT SOVIETS WERE INTERESTED IN SEEING SUCCESS OF US EFFORTS TO STABILIZE CEASE-FIRE AND TO ACHIEVE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM EGYPT. HE SAID THAT SOVIETS WERE UNDER CONSTANT PRESSURE FROM EGYPTIANS TO MAKE GOOD ON KOSYGIN'S AND BREZHNEV'S PROMISE TO ASSIST THEM IN ACHIEVING MAJOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, AND HE INDICATED THAT USSR WOULD LIKE TO SEE THIS PRESSURE REDUCED BY EFFECTIVE US INTERVENTION WITH ISRAELIS.

8. BIO NOTE: AT END OF CONVERSATION, YEDRASHNIKOV SAID USINTOFF SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT PRESENT SOVIET POLITICAL LEADERSHIP DID NOT, IN THE EYES OF SOVIETS OF YEDRASHNIKOV'S GENERATION, SEE THE WORLD THE WAY IT REALLY WAS: ITS MEMBERSHIP WAS, TO A DEGREE, ISOLATED FROM THE REALITIES OF CHANGE. IN SAYING THIS, YEDRASHNIKOV APPEARED TO BE TALKING OUT OF CLASS, ALTHOUGH IT IS POSSIBLE THAT HE WAS PASSING ON ANOTHER ONE OF HIS MANY MESSAGES.
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